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Abstract
We introduce and study the Generalized Cops and Robbers game (GCR), an N-player pursuit game in
graphs. The two-player version is essentially equivalent to the classic Cops and Robbers (CR) game. The
three-player version can be understood as two CR games played simultaneously on the same graph; a player
can be at the same time both pursuer and evader. The same is true for four or more players. We formulate
GCR as a discounted stochastic game of perfect information and prove that, for three or more players, it has
at least two Nash Equilibria: one in positional deterministic strategies and another in non-positional ones.
We also study the capturing properties of GCR Nash Equilibria in connection to the cop-number of a graph.
Finally, we briefly discuss GCR as a member of a wider family of multi-player graph pursuit games with
rather interesting properties.
1 Introduction
We introduce and study Generalized Cops and Robbers (GCR); it is a multi-player pursuit game closely related
to the classic two-player Cops and Robbers (CR) game [14, 16].
GCR is played on a finite, simple, undirected graph G by N players P1, P2, ..., PN (with N ≥ 2). The players
start at given vertices of the graph and at each turn one player moves to a vertex in the closed neighborhood of
his current position; the other players stay at their current vertices. The game effectively terminates when, for
some n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}, Pn captures Pn+1, i.e., when they are located in the same vertex; if no capture ever
takes place, the game continues ad infinitum.
Let us denote the GCR game with N players by ΓN . Then Γ2 is very similar to the classic CR game, where
P1 (the “cop”) tries to capture P2 (the “robber”). In Γ3, P1 tries to capture P2 who tries to evade P1 and
capture P3; P1 can never be captured and P3 can never capture. Hence Γ3 can be understood as two CR games
played simultaneously on the same graph; a player is both pursuer and evader at the same time. The situation
is extended similarly for higher N values.
As we will show, Γ2 can be formulated as a zero-sum stochastic game which has a value (and both players
have optimal strategies). On the other hand, for N ≥ 3, ΓN is a non-zero sum game and the main question is
the existence of Nash Equilibria (NE). As we will show, more than one such equilibria always exist and they
sometimes lead to surprising player behavior. In this sense, GCR presents novel and (we hope) mathematically
interesting problems.
There is a rich literature on pursuit games in graphs, Euclidean spaces and other more general structures but
it is generally confined to two-player games.
The seminal works on pursuit games in graphs are [14, 16] in which the classic CR game was introduced. A
great number of variations of the classic game have been studied; an extensive and recent review of the related
literature appears in the book [1]. However, practically all of this literature concerns two-player games. Classic
CR and its variants may involve more than one cops, but all of them are tokens controlled by a single cop player.
A very interesting paper [2] deals with “generalized cops and robber games” but again the scope is restricted to
two-player games. In fact, the only previous work (of which we are aware) dealing with multi-player games of
∗The author thanks Steve Alpern and Pascal Schweitzer for several useful and inspiring discussions.
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pursuit in graphs is our own [12]. It is also remarkable that, while classic CR and many of its variants admit a
natural game theoretic formulation and study, this has not been exploited in the CR literature.
Regarding pursuit in Euclidean spaces, the predominant approach is in terms of differential games as intro-
duced in the seminal book [10]. There is a flourishing literature on the subject, which contains many works
involving multiple pursuers, but they are generally assumed to be collaborating [5, 11, 15, 18, 19]. The case of
antagonistic pursuers has been studied in some papers [8, 9] but the methods used in these works do not appear
to be easily applicable to the study of pursuit / evasion on graphs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is preliminary: we introduce notation, define states, histories
and strategies and give a general form of the payoff function. In Section 3 we prove that, for any graph and any
number of players, GCR has a NE in deterministic positional strategies ; this result is applicable not only to GCR
but to a wider family of pursuit games, as will be discussed later. In Section 4 we show that in the two-player
GCR game: (i) the value of the game exists (essentially it is the logarithm of the optimal capture time) and (ii)
both players have optimal deterministic positional strategies. Because of the close connection of GCR to the
classical CR game, these results also hold for CR; while they have been previously established by graph theoretic
methods, we believe our proof is the first game-theoretic one. In Section 5 we study the three-player GCR game
and prove: (i) the existence of a NE in deterministic positional strategies; (ii) the existence of an additional NE
in deterministic but non-positional strategies; (iii) various results connecting the classic cop number of a graph
to capturability. In Section 6 we briefly discuss N -players GCR when N ≥ 4. In Section 7 we show that the
ideas behind GCR can be generalized to obtain a large family of multi-player pursuit games on graphs. Finally,
in Section 8 we summarize, present our conclusions and discuss future research directions.
2 Preliminaries
The following notations will be used throughout the paper.
1. Given a graph G = (V,E), for any x ∈ V , N (x) is the neighborhood of x: N (x) = {y : {x, y} ∈ E}; N [x]
is the closed neighborhood of x: N [x] = N (x) ∪ {x}.
2. The cardinality of set A is denoted by |A|; the set of elements of A which are not elements of B is denoted
by A\B.
3. N is the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ...} and N0 is {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. For any M ∈ N we define [M ] =
{1, 2, ...,M}.
4. The graph distance (length of shortest path in G) between x, y ∈ V is denoted by dG (x, y) or simply by
d (x, y).
In Section 1 we have described GCR informally; now we define the elements of the game rigorously.
The game proceeds at discrete turns (time steps) and at every turn all players except one must remain at
their locations. In other words, at every turn t ∈ N, for every player except one, the action set (see (2.1) below)
is a singleton. This, in addition to the fact that all players are aware of all previously executed moves, means
that GCR is a perfect information game.
Any player Pn can have the first move, but afterwards they move in the sequence implied by their numbering:
Pn → Pn+1 → ...→ PN → P1 → P2 → ....
When a player has the move, he can either move to a vertex adjacent to his current one or stay in place. Hence
the game position or game state has the form s =
(
x1, x2, ..., xN , p
)
where xn ∈ V is the position (vertex) of the
n-th player and p ∈ [N ] is the number of the player who has the next move. The set of nonterminal states is
S =
{(
x1, x2, ..., xN , p
)
:
(
x1, x2, ..., xN
)
∈ V × V × ...× V and p ∈ [N ]
}
.
We introduce an additional terminal state s. Hence the full state set is
S = S ∪ {s} .
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We define Sn to be the set of states in which Pn has the next move:
for each n ∈ [N ] : Sn =
{
s : s =
(
x1, x2, ..., xN , n
)
∈ S
}
,
Hence the set of nonterminal states can be partitioned as follows:
S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ SN .
For any n ∈ [N − 1], we say that Pn captures Pn+1 iff they are located in the same vertex; the set of Pn-capture
states, i.e., those in which Pn captures Pn+1 is S˜
n:
for each n ∈ [N − 1] : S˜n =
{
s : s = (x1, x2, ..., xN , p) ∈ S and xn = xn+1
}
.
Hence nonterminal states can be partitioned into two sets:
capture states: SC = S˜1 ∪ S˜2 ∪ ... ∪ S˜N−1 ,
non-capture states: SNC = S\SC .
As already mentioned, when Pn has the move, he can move to any vertex in the closed neighborhood of x
n;
when another player has the move, Pn can only stay in place; when the game is in a capture state or in the
terminal state, every player has only the “null move” λ. Formally, when the game state is s, the n-th player’s
action set is denoted by An (s) and defined by
An (s) =

N [xn] when s =
(
x1, x2, ..., xN , n
)
∈ Sn ∩ SNC ,
{xn} when s =
(
x1, x2, ..., xN ,m
)
∈ Sm ∩ SNC with m 6= n,
{λ} when s ∈ SC ∪ {s} .
(2.1)
The players’ actions (i.e., moves) effect state-to-state transitions in the obvious manner. Suppose the game is
at position s ∈ Sn and Pn makes the move an ∈ An (s); then T (s, an) denotes the resulting game position. A
capture state always transits to s and s always transits to itself:
∀s ∈ SC : T (s, λ) = s and T (s, λ) = s.
We define the capture time to be
TC = min
{
t : x1t = x
2
t or x
2
t = x
3
t or ... or x
N−1
t = x
N
t
}
.
If no capture takes place, the capture time is TC =∞. Hence the game can evolve as follows.
1. If TC = 0 then the initial state s0 is a capture state and st = s for every t ∈ N = {1, 2, ...}.
2. If 0 < TC <∞ then:
(a) at the 0-th turn the game starts at some preassigned state s0 ∈ SNC ;
(b) at the t-th turn (for 0 < t < TC), the game moves to some state st ∈ SNC ;
(c) at the TC-th turn the game moves to some capture state sTC ∈ SC and
(d) at t = TC + 1 the game moves to the terminal state and stays there: for every t > TC , st = s.
3. Finally, if TC =∞ then st ∈ SNC for every t ∈ N0 = {0, 1, 2, ...}.
According to the above, the game starts at some preassigned state s0 =
(
x10, x
2
0, x
3
0, p0
)
and at the t-th turn
(t ∈ N) is in the state st =
(
x1t , x
2
t , ..., x
N
t , pt
)
. This results in a game history s =s0s1s2... . In other words, we
assume each play of the game lasts an infinite number of turns; however, if TC <∞ then st = s for every t > TC ;
hence, while the game lasts an infinite number of turns, it effectively ends at TC . We define the following history
sets.
1. Histories of length k : Hk = {s = s0s1...sk};
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2. Histories of finite length: H∗ = ∪∞k=1Hk;
3. Histories of infinite length: H∞ = {s = s0s1...sk...}.
A deterministic strategy is a function σn which assigns a move to each finite-length history:
σn : H∗ → V
At the start of the game Pn selects a σ
n which determines all his subsequent moves. We will only consider legal1
deterministic strategies2. A strategy profile is a tuple σ =
(
σ1, σ2, ..., σN
)
, which specifies one strategy for each
player. We are particularly interested in positional strategies, i.e., σn such that the next move depends only on
the current state of the game (but not on previous states or current time):
σn (s0s1...st) = σ
n (st) .
We define σ−n =
(
σj
)
j∈[N ]\{n}
; for instance, if σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
then σ−1 =
(
σ2, σ3
)
.
To complete the description of GCR we must specify the players’ payoff functions ; we will do this in several
steps. In this section we give a general form of the payoff function, which applies not only to GCR, but to a
broader family of N -player games (with N ≥ 2). In the next section we will prove that any game of this family
admits at least one NE in positional deterministic strategies. In subsequent sections we will treat separately the
cases of GCR with N = 2, N = 3 and N ≥ 4 players; in each case, by completely specifying the payoff function,
we will reach additional conclusions regarding the properties of the respective game.
For the time being we only specify that the total payoff function of the n-th player (n ∈ [N ]) has the form
Qn (s0, σ) =
∞∑
t=0
γtqn (st) , (2.2)
where: qn is the turn payoff (it depends on st, the game state at time t) which is assumed to be bounded:
∃M : ∀n ∈ [N ] , ∀s ∈ S : |qn (s)| ≤M ;
and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Since the total payoff is the sum of the discounted turn payoffs, GCR is a multi-player discounted stochastic
game [6]. Recall that a stochastic game is one which consists of a sequence of one-shot games, each of which
depends on the previous game played and the actions of the players. In GCR the players can limit themselves
to deterministic strategies; since the state transitions are also deterministic, while GCR is a “stochastic game”
in the above sense, in all cases of interest it will actually evolve in a deterministic manner.
We will denote by ΓN (G|s0) the GCR game played by N players on graph G, starting from state s0. Our
results hold for any γ ∈ (0, 1) so, for simplicity of notation, we omit the γ dependence. In addition, γ will be
omitted from statements of theorem, lemmas etc. in the rest if the paper, since all the results presented hold for
any γ ∈ (0, 1).
3 Nash Equilibria for Perfect Information Discounted Games
The following theorem shows that every ΓN (G|s0) has a Nash Equilibrium in deterministic positional strategies.
Theorem 3.1 For every graph G, every N ≥ 2 and every initial state s0 ∈ S the game ΓN (G|s0) admits a
profile of deterministic positional strategies σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, ..., σ̂N
)
such that
∀n ∈ [N ] , ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀σ
n : Qn
(
s0, σ̂
n, σ̂−n
)
≥ Qn
(
s0, σ
n, σ̂−n
)
. (3.1)
For every s and n, let un (s) = Qn (s, σ̂). Then the following equations are satisfied
∀n, ∀s ∈ Sn : σ̂n (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] , (3.2)
∀n,m, ∀s ∈ Sn : um (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σ̂n (s))) . (3.3)
1I.e., they never produce moves outside the player’s action set.
2As will be seen, since GCR is a game of perfect information, the player loses nothing by using only deterministic strategies.
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Proof. Fink has proved in [7] that every N -player discounted stochastic game has a positional NE in probabilistic
strategies; this result holds for the general game (i.e., with concurrent moves and probabilistic strategies and
state transitions). According to [7], at equilibrium the following equations must be satisfied for all m and s:
u
m (s) = max
pm(s)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
∑
a2∈A2(s)
...
∑
aN∈AN (s)
p1a1 (s) p
2
a2 (s) ...p
N
aN (s)
[
qm (s) + γ
∑
s′
Π
(
s′|s, a1, a2, ..., aN
)
u
m (s′)
]
,
(3.4)
where we have modified Fink’s original notation to fit our own; in particular:
1. um (s) is the expected value of um (s);
2. pmam (s) is the probability that, given the current game state is s, the m-th player plays action a
m;
3. pm (s) = (pmam (s))am∈Am(s) is the vector of all such probabilities (one probability per available action);
4. Π
(
s′|s, a1, a2, ..., aN
)
is the probability that, given the current state is s and the player actions are
a1, a2, ..., aN , the next state is s′ .
Now choose any n and any s ∈ Sn. For allm 6= n, the m-th player has a single move, i.e., we have Am (s) = {am},
and so pmam (s) = 1. Also, since transitions are deterministic,∑
s′
Π
(
s′|s, a1, a2, ..., aN
)
u
n (s′) = un (T (s, an)) .
Hence, for m = n, (3.4) becomes
u
n (s) = max
pn(s)
∑
an∈An(s)
pnan (s) [q
n (s) + γun (T (s, an))] . (3.5)
Furthermore let us define σ̂n (s) (for the specific s and n) by
σ̂n (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] . (3.6)
If (3.5) is satisfied by more than one an, we set σ̂n (s) to one of these arbitrarily. Then, to maximize the sum in
(3.5) the n-th player can set pn
σ̂n(s) (s) = 1 and p
n
a (s) = 0 for all a 6= σ̂
n (s). Since this is true for all states and
all players (i.e., every player can, without loss, use deterministic strategies) we also have un (s) = un (s). Hence
(3.5) becomes
un (s) = max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] = qn (s) + γun (T (s, σ̂n (s))) . (3.7)
For m 6= n, the m-th player has no choice of action and (3.5) becomes
um (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σ̂n (s))) . (3.8)
We recognize that (3.6)-(3.8) are (3.2)-(3.3). Also, (3.6) defines σ̂n (s) for every n and s and so we have obtained
the required deterministic positional strategies σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
.
Note that the initial state s0 plays no special role in the system (3.2)-(3.3). In other words, using the notation
u (s) =
(
u1 (s) , u2 (s) , ..., uN (s)
)
and u = (u (s))s∈S , we see that u and σ̂ are the same for every starting position
s0 and every game ΓN (G|s0) (when N,G and γ are fixed).
Fink’s proof requires that, for every n, the total payoff is Qn (s0, σ) =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tqn (st); but does not place any
restrictions (except boundedness) on qn. The same is true of our proof; hence Theorem 3.1 applies not only to
the GCR game, for which the form of qn will be specified in Sections 4, 5 and 6, but to a wider family of games,
which will be discussed in Section 7.
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4 GCR with Two Players and (Classic CR)
We now proceed to a more detailed study of Γ2 (G|s0). To this end, we first specify the form of the turn payoff
functions q1 and q2:
q1 (s) = −q2 (s) =
{
1 iff s ∈ S˜1
0 else.
. (4.1)
Recalling that TC is the capture time (and letting γ
∞ = 0), for every s0 and deterministic σ which result in
capture at time TC , we clearly have:
Q1 (s0, σ) = −Q
2 (s0, σ) = γ
TC .
So Γ2 (G|s0) is a zero-sum game. Furthermore, since logQ
1 (s0, σ) = TC log γ and log γ < 0, it follows that
P1 (resp. P2) will maximize his payoff by minimizing (resp. maximizing) capture time Tc. Hence we have the
following simple description:
Γ2 (G|s0) is a two-player game in which, starting from an initial position s0 =
(
x1, x2, p
)
, P1 attempts
to capture P2 in the shortest possible time and P2 attempts to delay capture as long as possible.
This is true whenever both players use deterministic strategies, which they can do without loss since Γ2 (G|s0)
is a perfect information game. In particular, according to Theorem 3.1, this holds when they play optimally. In
fact, according to Theorem 3.1 (for every G and s0) Γ2 (G|s0) has a NE σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
in deterministic positional
strategies. And, since Γ2 (G|s0) is a zero-sum game, it follows that σ̂
1, σ̂2 are optimal and yield the value of the
game. More precisely, we have the following.
Theorem 4.1 For every graph G and every initial state s0 ∈ S, the profile of deterministic positional strategies
σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
specified by Theorem 3.1 satisfies
max
σ1
min
σ2
Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ2
)
= Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2
)
= min
σ2
max
σ1
Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ2
)
.
Furthermore, σ̂1, σ̂2 and Qn
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2
)
can be computed by a value iteration algorithm [17]. Hence Γ2 (G|s0)
is completely solved.
Let us now discuss the connection of Γ2 (G|s0) to the classic CR game. Note that the above description of
Γ2 (G|s0) is almost identical to that of the time optimal version of the classic CR game (e.g., see [1, Section 8.6]).
We only have the following differences.
1. In Γ2 (G|s0) time is measured in turns; in classic CR it is measured in rounds, where each round consists
of one P1 turn and one P2 turn.
2. In Γ2 (G|s0) the starting position s0 is given; in classic CR it is chosen by the players, in an initial
“placement” round. In other words, classic CR starts with an “empty” graph; in the first turn of the 0-th
round P1 chooses his initial position; in the second turn P2, having observed P1’s placement chooses his
initial position (after placement, classic CR is played exactly as Γ2 (G|s0)).
At any rate, the important points are the following.
1. Having computed the values u (s0) of Γ2 (G|s0) for every s0 ∈ S, we can easily obtain the optimal capture
time T̂C of the classic CR game
3 as follows:
T̂C =
log
(
maxx1 minx2 u
1
((
x1, x2, 1
)))
log γ
;
furthermore, any x̂1, x̂2 which satisfy T̂C =
log u1((x̂1,x̂2,1))
log γ are optimal initial placements for P1 and P2;
and the optimal policies of Γ2 (G|s0) are time optimal policies (after placement) of the classic CR.
3Up to a time rescaling, due to the abovementioned difference of of time units.
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2. In the classic CR literature, a graph G is called cop-win iff a single cop can capture the robber when both
cop and robber play optimally on G. In the more general case, where the cop player controls one or more
cop tokens, the cop number of G is denoted by c (G) and defined to be the smallest number of cop tokens
which guarantees capture when CR is played optimally on G. Clearly a graph is cop-win iff c (G) = 1. It
is easily seen that we can check whether G is cop-win by solving Γ2 (G|s0) (for all s0) as indicated by the
following equivalence:
c (G) = 1⇔ max
x1
min
x2
u1
((
x̂1, x̂2, 1
))
> 0. (4.2)
While the above questions regarding classic CR have been studied in the related literature and answered using
graph theoretic methods, the connection to Game Theory appears to not have been previously exploited.
5 GCR with Three Players
By substituting N = 3 in the definitions of Section 2 we obtain the game Γ3 (G|s0); in particular we get the sets
of capture states
S˜1 =
{
s :
(
x1, x2, x3, p
)
, x1 = x2
}
(P1 captures P2),
S˜2 =
{
s :
(
x1, x2, x3, p
)
, x2 = x3
}
(P2 captures P3)
and we use these to define the turn payoffs qn as follows
q1 (s) =
{
1 iff s ∈ S˜1,
0 else;
q2 (s) =

−1 iff s ∈ S˜1,
1 iff s ∈ S˜2\S˜1,
0 else;
q3 (s) =
{
−1 iff s ∈ S˜2\S˜1,
0 else.
.
(5.1)
Note that, according to previous remarks, P2 (resp. P3) is rewarded (resp. penalized) when P2 captures P3 and
is not simultaneously captured by P1. Also, recall that the total payoff function is, as usual,
∀n ∈ [3] : Qn (s0, s1, ...) =
∞∑
t=0
γtqn (st) .
We are now ready to study Γ3 (G|s0).
5.1 Nash Equilibria: Positional and Non-Positional
By Theorem 3.1 we know that Γ3 (G|s0) has, for every G and s0, a NE in deterministic positional strategies. In
addition, as we will now show, Γ3 (G|s0) has at least one NE in non-positional deterministic strategies.
To this end we will introduce a family of auxiliary games and threat strategies [3, 4, 20]. For every n ∈ [3]
we define the game Γ˜n3 (G|s0) played on G (and starting at s0) by Pn against a player P−n who controls the
remaining two entities. For example, in Γ˜13 (G|s0), P1 plays against P−1 who controls P2 and P3. The Γ˜
n
3 (G|s0)
elements (e.g., movement sequence, states, action sets, capturing conditions etc.) are the same as in Γ3 (G|s0).
Pn uses a strategy σ
n and P−n uses a strategy profile σ
−n; these form a strategy profile σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
(which
can also be used in Γ3 (G|s0)). The payoffs to Pn and P−n in Γ˜n3 (G|s0) are
Q˜n (s0, σ) = Q
n (s0, σ) =
∞∑
t=0
γtqn (st) and Q˜
−n (s0, σ) = −Q˜
n (s0, σ) .
Since the capture rules of Γ˜n3 (G|s0) are those of Γ3 (G|s0), P−n can use one of his tokens to capture the other.
For instance, in Γ˜13 (G|s0), P−1 can use P2 to capture P3 (as will be seen in a later example, in certain cases this
can be an optimal move). Note however that in this case P1 receives zero payoff (since he did not capture) and
P−1 also receives zero payoff (since, by construction, Γ˜
1
3 (G|s0), is a zero-sum game).
In short, Γ˜n3 (G|s0) is a two-player zero-sum discounted stochastic game and the next Lemma follows from
the results of [6, Theorem 4.3.2].
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Lemma 5.1 For every n,G and s0 the game Γ˜
n
3 (G|s0) has a value and the players have optimal deterministic
positional strategies.
Furthermore, the value and optimal strategies can be computed by Shapley’s value-iteration algorithm [17].
Let us denote by φ̂nn (resp. φ̂
−n
n ) the optimal strategy of Pn (resp. P−n) in Γ˜
n
3 (G|s0). For example, in Γ˜
1
3 (G|s0),
P1 has the optimal strategy φ̂
1
1 and P−1 has the optimal strategy φ̂
−1
1 =
(
φ̂21, φ̂
3
1
)
. In fact the same φ̂mn ’s (for
fixed n and any m ∈ [3]) are optimal in Γ˜n3 (G|s0) for every initial position s0.
We return to Γ3 (G|s0), and for each Pn we introduce the threat strategy pin defined as follows:
1. as long as every player Pm (with m 6= n) follows φ̂mm, Pn follows φ̂
n
n;
2. as soon as some player Pm (with m 6= n) deviates from φ̂mm, Pn switches to φ̂
n
m and uses it for the rest of
the game4.
Note that the pin strategies are not positional. In particular, the action of a player at time t may be influenced
by the action (deviation) performed by another player at time t− 2. However, as we will now prove,
(
pi1, pi2, p̂i3
)
is a (non-positional) NE in Γ3 (G|s0).
Theorem 5.2 For every G, s0 and γ, we have:
∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} , ∀pin : Qn(s, pi1, pi2, pi3) ≥ Qn(s, pin, pi−n). (5.2)
Proof. We choose some initial state s0 and fix it for the rest of the proof. Now let us prove (5.2) for the case
n = 1. In other words, we will show that
∀pi1 : Q1(s0, pi
1, pi2, pi3) ≥ Q1(s0, pi
1, pi2, pi3). (5.3)
We take any pi1 and let
the history produced by (pi1, pi2, pi3) be ŝ = ŝ0ŝ1ŝ2...,
the history produced by (pi1, pi2, pi3) be s˜ = s˜0s˜1s˜2...,
(where ŝ0 = s˜0 = s0). We define T1 as the earliest time in which pi
1 and pi1 produce different states:
T1 = min {t : s˜t 6= ŝt} ,
If T1 =∞, then s˜ = ŝ and
Q1(s, pi1, pi2, pi3) = Q1(s, pi1, pi2, pi3). (5.4)
If T1 <∞, on the other hand, then s˜t = ŝt for every t < T1 and we have
Q1(s, pi1, pi2, pi3) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (ŝt) +
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (ŝt) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) +
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (ŝt) , (5.5)
Q1(s, pi1, pi2, pi3) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) +
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (s˜t) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) +
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (s˜t) . (5.6)
We define s∗ = ŝT1−1 = s˜T1−1 and proceed to compare the sums in (5.5) and (5.6).
First consider
∑∞
t=T1−1
γtq1 (ŝt). The history ŝ = ŝ0ŝ1ŝ2... is produced by (φ̂
1
1 , φ̂
2
2 , φ̂
3
3 ) and, since the φ̂
n
n’s
are positional strategies, we have
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (ŝt) = γ
T1−1
∞∑
t=0
γtq1 (ŝT1−1+t) = γ
T1−1Q˜1
(
s∗, φ̂11, φ̂
2
2, φ̂
3
3
)
, (5.7)
4Since Γ3 (G|s0) is a perfect information game, the deviation will be detected immediately.
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i.e., up to the multiplicative constant γT1−1, the sum in (5.7) is the payoff to P1 in Γ˜
1
3 (G|s
∗), under the strategies
φ̂11,
(
φ̂22, φ̂
3
3
)
. Since Γ˜13 (G|s
∗) is a zero-sum game in which the optimal response to φ̂11 is
(
φ̂21, φ̂
3
1
)
; hence we have
γT1−1Q˜1
(
s∗, φ̂11, φ̂
2
2, φ̂
3
3
)
≥ γT1−1Q˜1
(
s∗, φ̂11, φ̂
2
1, φ̂
3
1
)
. (5.8)
Next consider
∑∞
t=T1−1
γtq1 (s˜t). The history s˜ = s˜0s˜1s˜2... is produced by (pi
1, φ̂21, φ̂
3
1) and, since pi
1 is not
necessarily positional, s˜T1 s˜T1+1s˜T1+2... may depend on s˜0s˜1...s˜T1−2. However, we can introduce a (not necessarily
positional) strategy ρ1 which will produce the same history s˜T1 s˜T1+1s˜T1+2... as σ
1. 5 Then, since in Γ˜13 (G|s
∗)
the optimal response to
(
φ̂21, φ̂
3
1
)
is φ̂11, we have
γT1−1Q˜1
(
s∗, φ̂11, φ̂
2
1, φ̂
3
1
)
≥ γT1−1Q˜1
(
s∗, ρ1, φ̂21, φ̂
3
1
)
=
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (s˜t) . (5.9)
Combining (5.5)-(5.9) we have:
Q1(s0, pi
1, pi2, pi3) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) + γ
T1−1Q˜1(s∗, φ̂11, φ̂
2
2, φ̂
3
3)
≥
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) + γ
T1−1Q˜1(s∗, φ̂11, φ̂
2
1, φ̂
3
1)
≥
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) + γ
T1−1Q˜1(s∗, ρ1, φ̂21, φ̂
3
1) = Q
1(s, pi1, pi2, pi3).
and we have proved (5.3), which is (5.2) for n = 1. The proof for the cases n = 2 and n = 3 is similar and hence
omitted.
We have seen that every Γ3 (G|s0) has at least two deterministic NE (one in positional strategies and another
in non-positional ones); and in fact, as is well known, a stochastic game may possess any number of NE. On the
other hand, we only know how to compute a single NE of Γ3 (G|s0), namely the non-positional one of Theorem
5.2, which is constructed in terms of the two-player strategies of Γ˜n3 (G|s0). One may be tempted to construct
additional NE of Γ3 (G|s0) using the optimal strategies of Γ2 (G|s0). For example, one may reason as follows:
P3’s best chance to avoid capture in Γ3 (G|s0) is by ignoring P1 and playing his best (in Γ2 (G|s0)) evasion
strategy against P2. By a similar reasoning for the other players, one may conclude that,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
is a NE of
Γ3 (G|s0) if (i)
(
σ̂1, σ̂2
)
is a NE of Γ2 (G|s0) played between P1 and P2, and (ii)
(
σ̂2, σ̂3
)
is a NE of Γ2 (G|s0)
played between P2 and P3.
6 But this conclusion is wrong, as shown by the following example.
Example 5.3 Consider Γ2 (G|s0) when G is the graph of Figure 5.3 and s0 = (12, 2, 3), as indicated in the
figure (for the time being suppose P1 is not on the graph). P3 is the evader and his best strategy is to move
towards vertex 10, postponing capture as long as possible; P2 is the pursuer and his best strategy is to always
move toward P3. Now consider Γ3 (G|s0) with s0 = (1, 12, 2, 3). In this game, P3’s best strategy is to first move
into vertex 1 and afterwards always keep P1 between himself and P2; he can always achieve this and thus avoid
capture ad infinitum. And P2’s best strategy is to stay at vertex 12, keeping away from P1 for as long as possible.
So in this example P2 and P3’s optimal Γ2 (G|s0) strategies are not good (and certainly not in NE) in Γ3 (G|s0).
5We define ρ1 such that, when combined with s˜T1−1, φ̂
2
1
, φ̂3
1
, will produce the same history s˜T1 s˜T1+1s˜T1+2... as σ
1. Note that
ρ1 will in general depend (in an indirect way) on s˜0s˜1...s˜T1−2.
6A clarification is needed here: the domain of Γ2 (G|s0) (positional) strategies is V ×V ×{1, 2}, while the the domain of Γ3 (G|s0)
(positional) strategies is V × V × V × {1, 2}. However we can “extend” a Γ2 (G|s0) strategy to use it in Γ3 (G|s0). For example,
suppose σ1
(
x1, x2
)
is a P1 strategy in Γ2 (G|s0); then it can also be extended to a Γ3 (G|s0) strategy σ˜1
(
x1, x2, x3
)
by letting
∀x3 : σ˜1
(
x1, x2, x3
)
= σ1
(
x1, x2
)
.
In other words, P1 applies σ1 in Γ3 (G|s0) by ignoring P3’s position. We will often use this and similar constructions in what follows,
without further comment; and we will denote the Γ2 (G|s0) and Γ3 (G|s0) strategies by the same symbol, e.g., σn.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11
12
P1 P3
P2
Figure 1: A case in which the CR optimal strategies do not achieve NE in Γ3(G|s0).
5.2 Capturability
In Section 4 we have presented a connection between the cop number of G and “capturability” in Γ2 (G|s0); this
was described by (4.2) which can be equivalently rewritten as
(∀s0 every optimal σ̂ of Γ2 (G|s0) results in capture)⇔ c (G) = 1. (5.10)
The analog of (5.10) in Γ3 (G|s0) would be:
(∀s0 every NE σ̂ of Γ3 (G|s0) results in capture)⇔ c (G) = 1. (5.11)
As will be seen, (5.11) is not true. But connections between cop number and capturability exist, as will be
established in the remainder of this section. To this end, we first define the capture function K3 (G|s0, σ).
Definition 5.4 For the game Γ3 (G|s0) played with strategies σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
, we write
K3 (G|s0, σ) =

0 when Q1 (s0, σ) = Q
2 (s0, σ) = Q
3 (s0, σ) = 0,
1 when Q1 (s0, σ) > 0,
2 when Q2 (s0, σ) > 0.
Roughly, K3 (G|s0, σ) tells us which player (if any) achieves a capture in Γ3 (G|s0) played with
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
:
1. K3 (G|s0, σ) = 0⇔ Q1 (s0, σ) = Q2 (s0, σ) = Q3 (s0, σ) = 0 ⇔ no capture takes place;
2. K3 (G|s0, σ) = 1⇔ Q
1 (s0, σ) > 0 ⇔ P1 captures P2;
3. K3 (G|s0, σ) = 2⇔ Q2 (s0, σ) > 0 ⇔ P2 captures P3 (and avoids being captured by P1).
A weaker version of (5.11) is:
(∀s0 there exists a capturing NE σ̂ of Γ3 (G|s0))⇒ c (G) = 1
and this can be rewritten and proved in terms of K3 (G|s0, σ), as follows.
Theorem 5.5 The following holds for every G:
(∀s0 there exists a NE σ̂ of Γ3 (G|s0) : K3 (G|s0, σ̂) > 0)⇒ c (G) = 1. (5.12)
Proof. To prove the theorem we will assume
(∀s0 there exists a NE σ̂ of Γ3 (G|s0) : K3 (G|s0, σ̂) > 0) and c (G) > 1 (5.13)
and reach a contradiction. To this end choose s0 =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
as follows.
1. Take arbitrary x1.
2. Take some x2 such that for s′0 =
(
x1, x2, 1
)
there exists a σ2 which is escaping in Γ2 (G|s
′
0) (this is always
possible, since c (G) > 1).
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3. Take some x3 such that for s′′0 =
(
x2, x3, 1
)
there exists a σ3 which is escaping in Γ2 (G|s′′0 ) (this is always
possible, since c (G) > 1).
Now let σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
be a capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0) and consider the following cases.
1. K3 (G|s0, σ̂) = 1; then, for some T1 we will have
Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= −γT1 < 0 ≤ Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
.
Because, when P1 and P2 play σ̂
1 and σ2, respectively, P2 will always escape P1 (since P3 can never
influence P2 moves). And furthermore, P2 may in fact capture P3, since σ̂
3 is not necessarily an escaping
strategy.
2. K3 (G|s0, σ̂) = 2; then, for some T2 we will have
Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= −γT2 < 0 = Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
Because, when P2 and P3 play σ̂
2 and σ3, respectively, P3 will always escape P2 (since P1 can never
influence P3 moves).
Since in every case some Pn can unilaterally improve Q
n (s0, σ̂), σ̂ cannot be a NE of Γ3 (G|s0).
Hence for every cop-win graph G and every starting state s0, Γ3 (G|s0) has a capturing NE. However, perhaps
surprisingly, there exists cop-win graphs and starting states for which Γ3 (G|s0) also has noncapturing NE, as
the following example shows.
Example 5.6 Take a path with P1 and P2 at the endpoints and P3 at the middle, as shown in Figure 2. The
1 2 3 4 5
P1 P3 P2
Figure 2: A graph G in which Γ3 (G|s0) has a noncapturing NE.
strategy profile σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
is defined as follows.
1. σ1: P1 stays in place as long as P2 does not move; if P2 moves, P1 chases him.
2. σ2: P2 stays in place as long as P3 does not move; if P3 moves, P2 chases him.
3. σ3: P3 stays in place as long as nobody moves; if P1 moves, P3 goes towards P2; if P2 moves, P3 goes
towards P1.
We will now show σ is a noncapturing NE of Γ (G|s0). Obviously we have
∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} : Qn
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
= 0.
We will show no player profits by unilaterally changing his strategy.
1. Say P1 uses any strategy σ
1. If, by σ1, he moves at some time, then P3 goes towards P2 and P2 goes
towards P3 resulting in a capture of P3 by P2. Hence
Q1
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
= 0 = Q1
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
. (5.14)
2. Say P2 uses any strategy σ
2. If, by σ2, he moves at some time, then P3 goes towards P1 and P1 goes
towards P2 resulting in a capture of P2 by P1. Hence
Q2
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
< 0 = Q2
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
. (5.15)
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3. Say P3 uses any strategy σ
3. If, by σ3, he moves at some time, then P2 goes towards P3 and then P1 goes
towards P2. Depending on P3’s moves we may have a capture of P2 by P1 or of P3 by P2. In either case
Q3
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
≤ 0 = Q3
(
s0,
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
))
. (5.16)
Combining (5.14)-(5.16) we get
∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} , ∀σn : Qn
(
s0,
(
σn, σ−n
))
≤ Qn (s0, σ)
which shows that σ is a noncapturing NE of Γ (G|s0).
The above example shows that the converse of Theorem 5.5 does not hold, i.e., there exist cop-win graphs
G and initial states s0 such that Γ3 (G|s0) has noncapturing NE. However we can prove a weaker result: the
converse does hold when G is a tree.
The first step in our proof is to revisit the two-player game Γ˜23 (G|s0) of Section 5.1. Recall that it is played
between P2 and P−2 who controls the tokens P1 and P3. We now prove the following.
Theorem 5.7 If c (G) = 1 then every optimal profile σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
of Γ˜23 (G|s0) is a NE of Γ3 (G|s0).
Proof. Let us choose some initial state s0 and some optimal (in Γ˜
2
3 (G|s0)) profile σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
, and keep
them fixed for the rest of the proof.
For any σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
, the capture functionK3 (G|s0, σ) will take a value in {0, 1, 2}. The values correspond
to three outcomes in Γ3 (G|s0) and the same outcomes are obtained in Γ˜23 (G|s0) (the two games differ in their
payoffs but are played by the same rules):
1. K3 (G|s0, σ) = 1 means P1 captures P2;
2. K3 (G|s0, σ) = 2 means P2 captures P3 (and is not captured by P1);
3. K3 (G|s0, σ) = 0 means neither P2 nor P3 is captured.
So we will consider the three mutually exclusive cases separately.
I. K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
))
= 1 . Let us examine each player’s payoff.
1. For all
(
σ1, σ3
)
such that K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 1,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
optimality in Γ˜23 (G|s0), implies
Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q˜−2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
= Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
.
And for all
(
σ1, σ3
)
such that K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
6= 1 we have
Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
> 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
.
Hence
∀σ1, σ3 : Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
⇒ ∀σ1 : Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
(5.17)
2. For all
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
we have
Q2
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3
)
= Q˜2
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3
)
;
combining with optimality in Γ˜23 (G|s0) we get
∀σ2 : Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q˜2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q˜2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
= Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
. (5.18)
3. And finally
∀σ1, σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 ≥ Q3
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
⇒ ∀σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 ≥ Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
.
(5.19)
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Combining (5.17)-(5.19), we see that
K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
))
= 1⇒ ∀n, ∀σn : Qn (s0, σ̂) ≥ Q
n
(
s0, σ
n, σ̂−n
)
. (5.20)
II. K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
))
= 2. Then the following hold.
1. From
(
σ̂1, σ̂3
)
optimality we have
∀σ1, σ3 : 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
> Q˜−2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
. (5.21)
We cannot have K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 1, because then we would also have Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
> 0,
which contradicts (5.21). If we have either K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 2 or K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 0 then
Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
.
In short
∀σ1, σ3 : Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
⇒ ∀σ1 : Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
(5.22)
2. By the same argument as in the previous case we get
∀σ2 : Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
. (5.23)
3. Finally
∀σ1, σ3 : 0 > Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q˜−2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
. (5.24)
We cannot have K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 0 or K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 1, because then we would also
have Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
≥ 0 which contradicts (5.24). Hence K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 2 and then
Q3
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
= Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
;
hence from (5.24) we get
∀σ1, σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q3
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
and then
∀σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
. (5.25)
Combining (5.22)-(5.25),we see that
K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
))
= 2⇒ ∀n, ∀σn : Qn (s0, σ̂) ≥ Q
n
(
s0, σ
n, σ̂−n
)
. (5.26)
III. K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
))
= 0 .
1. For all σ1, σ3 we have
Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 = Q˜−2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
. (5.27)
We cannot have K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 1, because then we would also have Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
>
0, which would contradict (5.27). If K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 2 or K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 0 then
Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
= 0 and so
∀σ1, σ3 : 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
⇒ ∀σ1 : Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
.
(5.28)
2. By the same argument as in the previous cases we get
∀σ2 : Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
. (5.29)
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3. Finally, we have seen that, for all
(
σ1, σ3
)
, either K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 2 orK3
(
G|s0,
(
σ1, σ̂2, σ3
))
= 0;
in both cases
∀σ1, σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= Q˜−2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q˜−2
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
= Q3
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
and so
∀σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
. (5.30)
Combining (5.28)-(5.30), we see that
K3
(
G|s0,
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
))
= 0⇒ ∀n, ∀σn : Qn (s0, σ̂) ≥ Q
n
(
s0, σ
n, σ̂−n
)
. (5.31)
In conclusion, combining (5.20), (5.26) and (5.31) we see that: every profile
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
which is optimal in
Γ˜23 (G|s0) is also a NE of Γ3 (G|s0).
Before we prove additional facts about Γ˜23 (G|s0) we need the following.
Definition 5.8 A graph G is called median if for every three vertices x, y, and z there exists a unique vertex
m (x, y, z) (the median vertex of x, y, z) which belongs to shortest paths between each pair of x, y, z.
The following facts are well known [13]. First, every tree is a median graph. Second, in a tree the union of
the three (unique) shortest paths between the pairs of vertices x, y, and z is
1. either a path, in which case the median m (x, y, z) is equal to one of x, y, or z;
2. or a subtree formed by three paths meeting at a single central node,which is the median of x, y, and z.
Now we can prove some additional properties of Γ˜23 (G|s0).
Theorem 5.9 If G is a path then, for any s0, every strategy profile σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
which is optimal in Γ˜23 (G|s0)
is capturing.
Proof. If s0 is a capture state, the theorem is obviously true. Take any non-capture starting state s0 =(
x10, x
2
0, x
3
0, p
)
; since G is a path, it is a median graph and one of x10, x
2
0, x
3
0 is the median of the other two (we
will also say that either x10, x
2
0, x
3
0 or P1, P2, P3 are collinear). We define strategies σ
1, σ2, σ3 for each case.
1. If x10 is the median of x
2
0 and x
3
0, then: P1 moves towards P2, P2 moves away from P1 and P3 stays in place;
eventually P2 is captured.
2. If x20 is the median of x
1
0 and x
3
0, then: P1 moves towards P2, P2 moves towards P3 and P3 moves away
from P2; eventually P3 is captured.
3. If x30 is the median of x
1
0 and x
2
0, then: P1 moves towards P2, P2 moves away from P1 and P3 moves away
from P2; eventually P2 is captured.
In every case σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3
)
is capturing and optimal. Since σ is capturing, the same holds for every optimal
profile σ̂, because they all yield the same payoff.
The above defined σ will be called path strategies and will be used to prove the following lemma, needed to
extend Theorem 5.9 to trees.
Lemma 5.10 If G is a tree then there exists a positional profile σ˜ =
(
σ˜1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
for which the following hold in
Γ˜23 (G|s0).
1. For every s0:
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
results in capture.
2. If
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
results in capture of P2 then, for every σ
2,
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ2, σ˜3
)
results in capture of P2.
3. If
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
results in capture by P2 then for every σ
1, σ3,
(
s0, σ
1, σ˜2, σ3
)
results in capture by P2.
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P1
mt0
P3
P2
(a)
P1
a
mt0
P3
P2
(b)
P1
a b
mt0
P3
P2
(c)
Figure 3: Possible placements of P1, P2, P3 in the proof of Theorem 5.10.
Proof. A rough description of σ˜ is quite simple: each player tries to reach the median as fast as possible;
as soon as this happens the players are collinear and they start playing their path strategies. We next give a
(straightforward but rather tedious) rigorous proof. In what follows, we denote the median of x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t by mt.
For Part 1 of the theorem, we distinguish two cases.
Case A. Suppose that at some time t the game state is
(
x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t , p
)
where one of x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t is the median of
the other two (they are collinear). In this case σ˜ = σ, i.e., the players use the path strategies of Theorem 5.9. It
is easily checked that the players remain collinear for the rest of the game and a capture results.
Case B. Suppose that x10, x
2
0, x
3
0 are not collinear. The initial part of σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3 prescribes that every player
moves directly towards the median mt. As a result, let t0 denote the first time when a (single) player Pn is
at distance 1 from mt, as depicted in Figures 3 and 4 (in the figures we only show the subtree of G which is
defined by the positions of P1, P2 and P3; dotted lines indicate paths of length one or more). We will now define
σ˜1, σ˜2, σ˜3 depending on which Pn first reaches mt; when some move is not specified, the respective strategy can
be defined arbitrarily.
1. Suppose Pn = P1, i.e. at t0 we have d
(
x1t0 ,mt0
)
= 1, as shown in Fig. 3.a. P3 stays in place at t0 + 2, P1
enters mt at t0 + 3 and the players become collinear. Now every player starts using his path strategy. It
is easy to check that this results in capture of P2.
2. Suppose Pn = P2, i.e., at t0 we have d
(
x2t0 ,mt0
)
= 1. Now we must distinguish two sub-cases.
(a) Say d
(
x1t0 ,mt0
)
= 2, as in Fig. 3.b. P3 stays in place at t0+1 and t0+4, P1 moves to a at t0+2 and
to mt at t0 + 5, when the players become collinear and start playing their path strategies; eventually
P2 is captured.
(b) Say d
(
x1t0 ,mt0
)
≥ 3, as in Fig. 3.c. P2 enters mt at time t0 + 3, the players become collinear and
start playing their path strategies; eventually P3 is captured.
3. Suppose Pn = P3, i.e. at t0 we have d
(
x3t0 ,mt0
)
= 1. Now we must distinguish four sub-cases.
P1 a mt0 u P2
P3
(a)
P1 a b mt0 u P2
P3,
(b)
P1 a b c mt0 u P2
P3(c)
P1 mt0 v u P2,
P3,(d)
Figure 4: Possible placements of P1, P2, P3 in the proof of Theorem 5.10.
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(a) Say d
(
x1t ,mt
)
= 2, d
(
x2t ,mt
)
= 2, as in Fig. 4.a. P1 enters a at t0 + 1, P2 enters u at t0 + 2 and P3
stays in place at t0 + 3. At t0 + 4 P1 enters mt, the players become collinear and start playing their
path strategies; eventually P2 is captured.
(b) Say d
(
x1t ,mt
)
= 3, d
(
x2t ,mt
)
= 2, as in Fig. 4.b. P1 enters a at t0 + 1, P2 enters u at t0 + 2 and P3
stays in place at t0 +3. At t0 +4 P1 enters b and at t0 +7 he enters mt, the players become collinear
and start playing their path strategies; eventually P2 is captured.
(c) Say d
(
x1t ,mt
)
≥ 4, d
(
x2t ,mt
)
= 2, as in Fig. 4.c. P2 enters u at t0 + 2 and mt at t0 + 5, at which
time the players become collinear and start playing their path strategies; eventually P3 is captured.
(d) Say d
(
x2t ,mt
)
≥ 3, as in Fig. 4.d. At t0 + 3 P3 enters mt , the players become collinear and start
playing their path strategies; eventually P2 is captured.
This completes the description of σ˜ =
(
σ˜1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
and it is readily seen that it always leads to capture; so the
first part of the theorem has been proved.
For Part 2 of the theorem, assume that
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
leads to P2 capture; there are two ways for this to happen.
Either the players are collinear in s0 and P2 is not in the middle; in this case P2 is captured for every σ
2 he
uses. Or the players are not collinear in s0 but eventually reach one of cases 1, 2.a, 3.a, 3.b, 3.d; in this case,
if P2 uses a σ
2 which deviates from σ˜2, he will approach mt no faster than if he used σ˜
2 and a straightforward
examination of cases 1, 2.a, 3.a, 3.b, 3.d shows that
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ2, σ˜3
)
will also lead to capture of P2.
The proof of Part 3 is similar to that of Part 2 and hence omitted.
Now we can expand Theorem 5.9 from paths to trees.
Theorem 5.11 If G is a tree then, for any s0, every strategy profile σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
which is optimal in
Γ˜23 (G|s0) is capturing.
Proof. Let σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
be an optimal (for any s0) strategy profile and take some s0 such that
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
leads to capture of P2. Then, by Part 2 of Lemma 5.10, we have
∀σ2 : Q˜2
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ2, σ˜3
)
< 0
and so
Q˜2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= min
σ1,σ3
max
σ2
Q˜2
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3
)
≤ max
σ2
Q˜2
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ2, σ˜3
)
< 0;
in other words,
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
leads to capture of P2. Similarly, by Part 3 of Lemma 5.10 we can prove that, for
every s0 such that
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
leads to capture of P3, the same holds for
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
. Since, by Part 1 of
Lemma 5.10, for every s0,
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3
)
leads to capture (of either P2 or P3) we have proved the theorem.
Now we return to the three-player game Γ3 (G|s0) and show that: if G is a tree, then Γ3 (G|s0) has a capturing
NE for every initial state s0 (hence, while the converse of Theorem 5.5 does not hold for every cop-win graph, it
holds for the special case of trees).
Theorem 5.12 If G is a tree, then
∀s0 there exists a NE σ̂ of Γ3 (G|s0) : K3 (G|s0, σ̂) > 0.
Proof. Since G is a tree, every optimal profile σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
of Γ˜23 (G|s0) is capturing in both Γ˜
2
3 (G|s0) (by
Theorem 5.11); and in Γ3 (G|s0) (since the two games are played by the same rules). Hence K3 (G|s0, σ̂) > 0.
And σ̂ is a NE of Γ3 (G|s0) by Theorem 5.7 (since every tree G has c (G) = 1).
We conclude this section with a result for graphs which are not cop-win.
Theorem 5.13 c (G) > 1⇒ (∃s0 : Γ3 (G|s0) has a noncapturing NE σ̂)
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Proof. We will construct the required s0 and σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
. Since c (G) > 1, there exist an s˜0 =
(
x1, x2, p
)
and a Γ2 (G|s˜0)-optimal noncapturing profile σ˜ =
(
σ˜1, σ˜2
)
. Now let s0 =
(
x1, x2, x1, 1
)
and define the Γ3 (G|s˜0)
strategies as follows: σ̂2 is σ˜2 (expanded to work in Γ3 (G|s˜0) ) and, for n ∈ {1, 3}, σ̂n specifies that Pn always
stays in place. Then, since σ̂2 is an optimal evasion strategy we have:
∀σ1 : Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
;
also, since P2 must enter x
1 to capture P3, but then he would first be captured by P1, we have
∀σ2 : Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 ≥ Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
;
and since P3 never receives positive payoff we have
∀σ3 : Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= 0 ≥ Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
.
So s0 is a noncapturing NE of Γ (G|s0).
6 GCR with N Players, N ≥ 4
We will now briefly examine ΓN (G|s0) for N ≥ 4. Most of the game elements have been defined in Section 2;
we define the turn payoffs qn by generalizing (5.1). Namely, at every turn Pn receives:
1. a payoff of −1 if he is captured by Pn;
2. a payoff of 1 if he captures Pn+1, but is not simultaneously captured by Pn−1;
3. a payoff of 0 in every other case.
The above turn payoffs and the total payoff Qn of (2.2) complete the specification of ΓN (G|s0).
Since it is a multi-player discounted stochastic game of perfect information, ΓN (G|s0) has (by Theorem 3.1)
a NE in deterministic positional strategies. The N -player analog of Theorem 5.2 also holds.
Theorem 6.1 For every G, s0 and γ, ΓN (G|s0) has a NE pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., piN ) in deterministic (generally non-
positional) strategies.
Proof. The proof involves the use of the auxiliary two-player, zero-sum games Γ˜1N (G|s0) , ..., Γ˜
N
N (G|s0) . In
Γ˜nN (G|s0), Pn plays against P−n, who controls the tokens P1, ..., Pn−1, Pn+1, ..., PN . The threat strategies pi =
(pi1, pi2, ..., piN ) are defined in the same manner as in Section 5.1, in terms of the strategies
(
φ̂mn
)
m,n∈[N ]
which
are optimal in the corresponding Γ˜nN (G|s0) games. The rest of the proof is omitted, since it follows closely that
of Theorem 5.2.
Similarly to Γ3 (G|s0), if ΓN (G|s0) has a capturing NE for every initial state s0, then G is cop-win. This is
stated in the following theorem, where KN (G|s0, σ) is the obvious generalization of the capturability function
K3 (G|s0, σ) (the proof is omitted, since it is similar to that of Theorem 5.5).
Theorem 6.2 The following holds for every G:
(∀s0 there exists a NE σ̂ of ΓN (G|s0) : KN (G|s0, σ̂) > 0)⇒ c (G) = 1. (6.1)
On the other hand, Theorem 5.7 does not generalize to the case N ≥ 4. The following example shows that,
even when G is a path, there may exist optimal profiles σ̂ of Γ˜nN (G|s0) which are not NE of ΓN (G|s0).
Example 6.3 In Figure 6.3 G is a path, the tokens are positioned as depicted and P4 has the starting move;
in short s0 = (1, 3, 4, 5, 4). In the game Γ˜
2
4 (G|s0), P2 plays against P−2 who controls P1, P3, P4. Clearly the
optimal P−2 move from s0 is to move P4 into vertex 4, since then the game ends and P−2 receives his maximum
possible payoff of 0 (otherwise, on his first move P2 captures P3 and P−2 receives negative payoff). So every
σ̂−2 =
(
σ̂1, σ̂3, σ̂4
)
which is optimal in Γ˜24 (G|s0) must satisfy σ̂
4 (s0) = 4. But such a σ̂
−2 cannot be (part of) a
NE of Γ4 (G|s0), because in this game P4 can improve his payoff by moving from 5 to 6, rather than 4.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
P1 P2 P3 P4
Figure 5: A path G in which a Γ˜24 (G|s0)-optimal strategy profile is not a NE of Γ
2
4 (G|s0).
In Section 5 we have shown (Theorem 5.12) that, when G is a tree, for every s0 there exists a capturing NE
of Γ3 (G|s0); the proof depended on Theorem 5.7 which, as seen, does not generalize for N ≥ 4. Hence we have
not been able to generalize Theorem 5.12 either. On the other hand, we have not found a counterexample (i.e.,
a tree and some initial state for which no capturing NE exists) hence the matter remains open.
The following generalizes Theorem 5.13 and is proved very similarly.
Theorem 6.4 For every N ≥ 3 we have
c (G) > 1⇒ (∃s0 : ΓN (G|s0) has a noncapturing NE σ̂) .
7 More Multi-player Pursuit Games
In Section 2 we have developed a framework which we have used in Sections 4, 5 and 6 to study the game
ΓN (G|s0), for various N values. As we will now explain, this framework applies to a wider family of graph
pursuit games.
We have in mind games played by players P1, P2, ..., PN who take turns in moving tokens along the edges
of a graph. For the time being assume that each player controls one token and has, in general, two goals: (i) to
capture some (other players’) tokens and (ii) to avoid capture of his own token.
Any such situation can be described, by the formulation of Section 2, as a multi-player discounted stochastic
game of perfect information. Assuming, without loss of generality, that the players move in the sequence implied
by their numbering, the actual “capture relationship” will be encoded by the turn payoff functions qn. To
preserve the semantics of pursuit / evasion, they should have the form7
qn
((
x1, ..., xN , p
))
=

1 when for some m : xn = xm, m ∈ An,
−1 when for some m : xn = xm, m ∈ Bn,
0 else.
(7.1)
where
1. An is the set of Pn’s “targets” (i.e., the players whom he can capture) and
2. Bn is the set of Pn’s “pursuers” (i.e., the players who can capture him).
For example, in in Γ2 (G|s0) we have players P1 and P2 with respective sets
A1 =
{
P 2
}
, B1 = ∅, A2 = ∅, B2 = {P1} ;
while in Γ3 (G|s0) we have players P1, P2 and P3 with respective sets
A1 =
{
P 2
}
, B1 = ∅, A2 =
{
P 3
}
, B2 = {P1} , A
3 = ∅, B3 = {P2}
and the additional condition of no simultaneous captures (which, as, requires a small modification of (7.1)).
As a final example, consider a game which we could call “Cyclic Cops and Robbers”; it involves players P1, P2
and P3 in which: P1 chases P2 and avoids P3; P2 chases P3 and avoids P1; P3 chases P1 and avoids P2. In this
game we will have
A1 =
{
P 2
}
, B1 =
{
P 3
}
, A2 =
{
P 3
}
, B2 = {P1} , A
3 = {P1} , B
3 = {P2} .
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3 4
P1
P2 P3
Figure 6: On this graph Cyclic Cops and Robbers have only noncapturing NE.
This game has some interesting properties; they will be fully described in a separate publication, but as an
example suppose it is played on the star graph of Figure 6, with initial positions as indicated. It is easily checked
that, even though the star graph is cop-win, the game has only noncapturing NE.
Many similar games can be constructed along these lines and all of them will (i) fall within the game-theoretic
framework of Section 2 and (ii) possess a well defined game theoretic solution, namely a NE in deterministic
positional strategies, according to Theorem 3.1.
In fact the framework of Section 2 can accommodate further generalizations for which Theorem 3.1 will still
hold. We list some additional generalizations to the idea of graph pursuit game.
1. Payoffs. The turn payoffs qn can take values in [−1, 1] rather than {−1, 1}. As an example, we have
introduced and studied the game of Selfish Cops and Robbers [12], in which two cops pursue a robber but
do not split the capture payoff equally; instead the capturing (resp. noncapturing) cop receives payoff
(1− ε) (resp. ε), where ε ∈
[
0, 12
]
. Hence each cop has a motive to be the one who actually captures the
robber; if this “selfishness” is sufficiently strong (this will depend on the ε value) it can be exploited by
the robber to avoid capture ad infinitum.
2. Teams. So far we have assumed that each player controls a single token. But we can also assume that a
game is played by N players (with N ≥ 2) with Pn controlling Kn tokens. An example of this is the classic
CR game with more than one cop tokens (all of them controlled by a single cop player). Another example
are the Γ˜nN (G|s0) auxiliary games of Sections 5.1 and 6. These are two-player games, but the idea can be
applied to multi-player games as well. For example we could have the three-player GCR game with P1
controlling two pursuer tokens and each of P2 and P3 controlling one pursuer and one evader token.
3. Game termination. So far we have assumed that the game terminates upon the first capture, but this can
also be modified. For example the game could end upon the elimination of all tokens of one player, or
when no more captures are possible.
Since all of the above modifications can be accommodated by the formulation of Section 2, the respective
games can be analyzed by game-theoretic methods. At the very least, by Theorem 3.1 they all possess NE;
further results can be obtained by exploiting the special characteristics of each game.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced and studied the Generalized Cops and Robbers game ΓN (G|s0), a multi-player
pursuit game in graphs. The two-player version Γ2 (G|s0) is essentially equivalent to the classic CR game. The
three-player version Γ3 (G|s0) can be understood as two CR games played simultaneously on the same graph; a
player can simultaneously be pursuer and evader. This also holds for ΓN (G|s0) when N ≥ 4.
Using a formulation of ΓN (G|s0) as a discounted stochastic game of perfect information we have proved that
it has at least one NE in positional deterministic strategies. Using auxiliary two-player games Γ˜nN (G|s0) we have
7The conditions in (7.1) encode “minimum” requirements, additional restrictions may be imposed, e.g., no simultaneous captures.
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also proved the existence of an additional NE in nonpositional deterministic strategies. We have also studied the
capturing properties of the ΓN (G|s0) NE in connection to the cop-number c (G).
Both ΓN (G|s0) and Γ˜nN (G|s0) are members of a general family of graph pursuit games, which can be described
by the framework of Section 2 and its generalizations, presented in Section 7. This family is a broad generalization
of the two-player graph pursuit games previously studied to the multi-player case; it contains games with rather
unexpected properties and hence, we believe, it deserves additional study.
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